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Abstract
In a randomized experiment in cooperation with two national parties competing
in the 2013 congressional election in the Philippines, we estimate the causal effect
on voting behavior of a town-hall style campaign in which candidates discuss their
campaign platform with small groups of citizens. Keeping the parties’ platform fixed,
we find that this “deliberative” style of campaigning has a positive effect on parties’
vote shares compared to the status quo, in which voters play a passive role. Consistent
with the parties’ advocacy for underprivileged groups, we observe heterogeneous
effects by income and gender. We show that the larger effect of town-hall meetings
on women and poor voters arises because deliberative campaigns increase voters’
attention to parties’ platforms and change their attitudes on gender discrimination
and poverty.
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1 Introduction
Normative proponents of a participatory approach to political decision making suggest that deliberation
can lead to revelatory discussion (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Habermas 1996; Macedo 2010). On purely
instrumental grounds, deliberation may be an avenue through which individuals can reveal private infor-
mation prior to collective decision making, helping voters to implement more informed choices. (Austen-
Smith and Feddersen 2006; Coughlan 2000; Meirowitz 2006). Moreover, the opportunity of discussing rel-
evant issues might provide the motivation for citizens to actively become more informed about policy and
potentially act on this information (Esterling, Neblo and Lazer [2011]). In fact, laboratory and observational
evidence has shown that policy choices can be more effective in changing attitudes, eliciting information
and encouraging cooperation when they are chosen through deliberative settings (Ban, Jha and Rao 2012;
Barabas 2004; Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman 2010; Goeree and Yariv 2011; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).
In principle, if deliberative forums such as town hall meetings can increase citizens’ capacity to become
more informed and potentially change their political behavior, it might be in the interest of politicians to use
them as an electoral strategy to persuade voters of the merits of a desired alternative. In addition, opening
a debate about policy platforms could help both politicians and voters uncover common interests through
the revelation of valuable information.
Empirically, assessing the potential benefits of a deliberative campaign on a politician’s electoral prospects
is challenging, as these could be confounded with other factors that might affect both the behaviors of politi-
cians and citizens. Particularly, the effect that a political strategy might have on voting behavior is a function
of the platform message, the communication strategy, the intrinsic traits of the politician, and the audience
characteristics. Therefore, being able to disentangle what portion of the total effect in voting behavior is due
to the implementation of deliberative forums implies directly manipulating the communication strategy of
the campaign, while keeping fixed any other relevant variable that might affect voting behavior. In this
study, we implement such an experimental design by randomizing the assignment of town hall meetings
to different areas, while keeping campaign platforms fixed.
The implementation of the experiment involved the cooperation of two national party-lists competing
for representation in the legislative election of May, 2013 in the Philippines. Importantly, the two party-
lists with which we collaborated claimed to represent and advocate for distinct societal groups—namely
women in one platform and the urban poor in another —emphasizing distinct legislative policies favorable
to each of these groups in their campaign platforms. This allows us to measure the impact of town hall
meetings on the subset of voters that are more susceptible to the information contained in the campaign
messages. Moreover, the Filipino party-list contest is ideal to assess the effect of deliberative forums on
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electoral returns, as it permit us to focus on a type of party that distinguishes itself programatically from the
mainstream political organizations that compete in the general legislative, presidential and local mayoral
elections, where clientelistic practices, corruption, and vote buying have been widespread in the recent past
(e.g., Hicken et al. [2014]).1
The treatment we implement manipulates the communication strategy for each party-list platform.
First, we design a deliberative campaign in which the party-list message was communicated in town-hall
meetings, where voters and party representatives discussed and debated the party-list platform and its
potential implementation. The communication strategy in control villages was the “business-as-usual"
campaign that parties implemented elsewhere. The same platforms were delivered through “one-way"
communication technologies, such as the distribution of party propaganda and speeches in party rallies,
with no direct participation of voters or debate between party representatives and citizens.
In the control group, we explicitly did not introduce any restriction on the communication strategy
of party-lists except that town hall meetings were not to be implemented.2 We confirmed that party-lists
delivered the same platform message in both treatment and control areas, but we allowed parties to follow
their natural strategy in the latter. In this way, we ensure that our results are not driven by an artificial
condition imposed on politicians that could differ greatly from the way they would usually campaign.
Second, party-lists were randomly assigned to different areas and a treatment subset of these areas set
up two or three town hall meetings with around 40 participants each. This random assignment allowed us
to control for the effect that intrinsic party characteristics might have had on voting behavior. We do this
by focusing only on the electoral prospects of a particular party-list in treatment versus control areas.
Given the deliberative campaign strategy implemented in this experiment, we examine whether delib-
erating with a candidate about her policy platform affects voters’ attitudes and voting behavior differently
than in the “business-as-usual” condition, in which voters are not exposed to town hall meetings.
We posit that if town hall meetings have an impact on parties’ electoral returns, it works through both
1According to law, 20 percent of congressional seats are reserved for minority groups. To fill these seats,
voters do not choose candidates to represent their electoral districts, as in the first-past-the-post race that
apportions the remainder 80 percent of Congress, but for “party-lists” in a closed-list (CL), proportional
representation (PR) system. In other words, voters on Election Day cast two different votes for legislative
representation, one for their candidate in their district and one for their preferred party-list at the national
level.
2It is important to note here that deliberative campaigns, as the ones we designed for this experiment,
were not part of the campaign strategy of any of the involved party-lists, either in past elections or prior to
their agreement to cooperate with the experiment.
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its effectiveness on changing attendees’ attitudes and the indirect exposure of non-participants to the meet-
ings’ proceedings. On the one hand, the direct engagement with the candidate and other citizens facilitated
in a deliberative setting can motivate attendees to better learn about the private benefits and externali-
ties of programmatic policies proposed by candidates. This information in turn, might generate a better
benchmark or focal point with which to evaluate politicians. The increase in voters’ knowledge about the
candidate’s policies and its consequences on different societal groups might translate into an increase in
votes from those citizens whose most-preferred policy is closer to the party’s platform.
On the other hand, the potential indirect exposure of town hall meetings works through its spillovers
on those voters who do not attend the meetings. In this scenario, non-participants could become better
informed about the candidate’s political platform by the more engaged attendees who are willing to share
valuable information with members of their social network.
Our main results show that town hall meetings have a positive effect on both official and self-reported
measures of electoral support. Conditioning on casting a vote, party-lists increased their official vote shares
around 50 percent with respect to the control group when town hall meetings were implemented. In this
context, we do not find that deliberative campaigns increase turnout, as other campaign strategies, such as
face-to-face voter mobilization, appear to do (Gerber and Green 2000; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003).
This is not surprising, however, as we measure turnout as casting a valid vote in the party-list election,
which occurs concurrently with the election to other offices (e.g., House, senatorial, mayoral and provincial
elections). To the extent these other races are the main forces driving voters to the polls, no effects on
party-list turnout would be expected.
When we analyze potential heterogeneity on the effect of town hall meetings by treatment party-list and
socio-demographic characteristics using a post-election survey, we find positive and significant electoral
returns of the presence of town hall meetings only for women when the party-list that is campaigning is the
one running a feminist platform (i.e., Akbayan party). Similarly, we find a positive and significant effect of
town hall meetings only on the poor when the party-list that is campaigning is the one running the pro-poor
platform (i.e., Umalab Ka party).
The conditional impact of town hall meetings on voters’ behavior is consistent with an attitudinal
change towards gender inequality and sexism for those voters exposed to the feminist platform in town
hall meetings. Similarly, we observe a significant attitudinal change towards poverty and income inequal-
ity when voters are exposed to the pro-poor platform under the deliberative campaign.
In particular, voters exposed to the pro-poor platform in town hall meetings were more concerned
about poverty, income inequality and the relevance of conditional cash transfers by 0.142 standard devi-
ations units with respect to the control group. Similarly, voters increased their disagreement with gender
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discrimination and sexism by 0.328 standard deviation units with respect to the control group when they
were exposed to the feminist platform under deliberation.
These results confirm that deliberative campaigns are indeed an effective way of delivering a campaign
message and affect voters’ attitudes towards policy issues. More importantly, we find that the better un-
derstanding of the policy proposals in town hall meetings has relevant consequences on citizen’s voting
behavior.
Our analysis follows a burgeoning empirical literature implementing randomized field experiments in
actual campaigns with the collaboration of politicians. In particular, our paper is closely related to Fujiwara
and Wantchekon [2013], who provide experimental evidence, in the context of a presidential election in
Benin, that programmatic platforms transmitted through a deliberative campaign reduce the perception of
clientelism among voters and increase the electoral returns of the politicians who implement them.
Although these studies make a contribution on the relevance of platform transparency and communi-
cation strategies, they are unable to isolate the effect of deliberation from that of the platform content itself.
The platform content that politicians communicated to voters in these experiments also changed by treat-
ment status. Under deliberative campaigns, candidates and voters debated about a universalistic platform
that emphasized the national benefits of policies, whereas under the “business-as-usual" campaign, candi-
dates offered a mix of clientelistic goods (cash distribution, patronage, and discretionary spending), as well
as universalistic policies.
In contrast, our experiment focuses on an electoral race where parties can only implement legislation
in Congress and do not hold discretionary power to offer any type of particularistic spending. Thus, the
legislative platform offered by parties’ representatives remains fixed in both treatment and control areas,
allowing us to isolate the effect of deliberative campaigns while keeping the platform content fixed.
In the context of U.S. congressional elections, Esterling, Neblo and Lazer [2011] use a deliberative field
experiment to assess whether debating with incumbent representatives increases participants’ knowledge
about policy issues. Consistent with the spirit of our analysis, the authors find that participating in a de-
liberating session with the politician motivate constituents to become more informed about policy-relevant
issues.
With a similar approach of using field experiments with the collaboration of political candidates, Casey,
Glennester and Bidwell [2015] measure the impact of voters’ exposure to candidates’ debates on voting be-
havior, campaign spending, and politicians’ performance in Sierra Leone. The authors find that exposure to
debates results in a higher number of votes cast. Unlike our treatment that facilitates deliberation between
parties’ representatives and voters, they focus on the interaction between candidates from different parties
and the subsequent exposure of these debates to voters.
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Finally, our paper is related to the works of Kendall, Nannicini and Trebbi [2015] and Dewan, Humphreys
and Rubenson [2014] that, similar to our study, assess the effects of different informational campaign treat-
ments on voting behavior. The work of Kendall, Nannicini and Trebbi [2015] randomized the messages of
an electoral campaign in collaboration with an incumbent Italian mayor, while Dewan, Humphreys and
Rubenson [2014] worked with a campaign to randomize the messages and the messengers in the context
of a referendum in British Columbia. Unlike our paper, their messages did not involve a deliberative set-
ting. Instead, they manipulated the content of the messages themselves, making them either about the
candidate’s valence or ideology.
2 Background and Context from the Philippines
2.1 Historical Background
Since the reinstatement of electoral democracy in 1986, the Philippines’ political system has been formally
composed of a presidential executive and a bicameral legislative body. Within this body, the Senate is
composed of 24 members elected every six years, whereas the House of Representatives is composed of 292
members elected every three years.
The Philippines is currently divided into 80 provinces, headed by provincial governors. The next sub-
national level of government is the municipality, which is equivalent to a U.S. city or town, headed by
an elected mayor. Finally, municipalities and cities are subdivided into electoral barangays, which are the
equivalent of U.S. wards, and are headed by barangay captains. These electoral units, “barangays", are the
focus of our experiment’s design.
In broad terms, the Philippines’ historical evolution has been characterized by a legacy of extractive
economic institutions and a very unequal distribution of political power. Under Spanish colonialism, the
crown did not establish a centralized rule as in Latin America. Instead, it left political control of the Philip-
pine islands mainly to the Church.
In the early 20th century, when the U.S. replaced Spain as the colonial power, most of the Church
estates were expropriated and auctioned to the local elite. As a result, the main economic institutions came
to be dominated by large landowning families who controlled extensive patron-client networks in their
geographic regions of influence.
As a consequence of oligarchical power, in both periods of Philippine democracy (i.e., from indepen-
dence in 1946 to the declaration of martial law in 1972, and from the fall of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986
until the present), political parties have been little more than shifting coalitions of dynastic politicians and
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their followers (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003).3
The elite persistence in the Filipino case has not only been associated with a deficit of democratic quality,
but also with harmful consequences for economic growth and income distribution (Hedman and Sidel
[2000]). Furthermore, the prevalence of the status quo has prevented the emergence and consolidation of
political parties associated with broader constituencies and the perpetuation of rent-seeking behavior by
the political elite with narrow economic interests.
2.2 Party List Electoral System
In 1987, after the restoration of electoral democracy in the Philippines and during the tenure of the new
President Corazon Aquino, a commission was appointed to draft a new Constitution to replace the preva-
lent one during President Marcos’s regime.
The new constitution achieved many things, including reapportioning congressional districts, reduc-
ing the term lengths for members of the House of Representatives, and introducing term limits for all
elected officials. In addition, and with the intention of strengthening the party system and reducing the
elite monopoly of political power, the 1987 Constitution mandated that 20 percent of the lower House must
be composed of representatives of marginalized societal groups such as “labor, peasant, urban poor, in-
digenous cultural communities, women, youth, and other such sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector" (Article VI; Section 5.2). However, it was not until 1995 that the Party-List System Act
became law, with the mandate that “the state shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system. . .which will enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. . . to become members of the House
of Representatives" (Sec. 2).
Under this system, a voter can choose one party-list via closed list and each party that receives 2 percent
of the party-list vote is entitled to one seat and an additional seat for every 2 percent thereafter, for a max-
imum of three seats per party-list. Therefore, every three years at each House of Representatives election,
voters cast two votes, one for their district representative by plurality rule and one for a national party-list.
3For example, in the 2010 election, approximately 50 percent of elected politicians had a relative who
had previously served in office.
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3 Experimental Design
The campaign experiment we analyze here focuses on the party-list election that took place on May 13, 2013.
In this election, 58 out of 289 congress seats were allocated for party-list representatives among more than
130 registered parties. Two party-lists collaborated in the campaign field experiment: Akbayan, Citizens’
Action Party and Umalab Ka.
Akbayan is one of the most prominent party-lists nationwide and the more established of the two
participants in the experiment. It has consistently won at least one seat since its founding in 1998, and has
been one of the five most successful party-lists, of the more than 100 registered at the national level.
Founded as a left pluralist national party, Akbayan is a multi-sectoral party comprised of labor, peas-
ants, urban poor, women, LGBT, and youth organizations. In the 2013 campaign, however, Akbayan’s
message focused heavily on women. This was because Akbayan wanted to capitalize on a recent high-
profile legislative victory concerning reproductive rights, as well as its candidate for Senator, a well-known
feminist activist.4 In the May 2013 election, Akbayan was able to secure around 2.9 percent of the popular
vote at the national level, which translated into two seats in the House of Representatives.
In contrast, Umalab Ka, although formally founded in 2003, did not participate in a party-list election
until 2013. This party-list is composed mainly of urban poor organizations and informal sector workers (i.e.,
drivers, street vendors, and house servants). As a political organization, Umalab Ka has dealt in the past
with issues such as the demolition of informal settlers dwellings, discussions with government agencies
affecting the plight of the urban poor and other peripheral issues that directly affect the lives of informal
laborers and other marginalized sectors in society. The primary legislative agenda of Umalab Ka includes
the creation of a Magna Carta to protect workers in the informal sector.5 In the 2013 election, Umalab Ka
won around 0.16 percent of the national vote and therefore was not able to secure any representatives in
Congress.
3.1 Sample Selection
The evaluation of the campaign experiment focuses on electoral returns, looking at both official aggregate
data for each barangay and self-reported voting behavior at the individual level, with information on 39
barangays randomly selected from 13 municipalities following a two-stage cluster sampling. As shown on
the map in Figure 1, we randomly selected 7 out of 17 available municipalities from the National Capital
4The platform and constitution of the Akbayan party-list can be found at www.akbayan.org.ph.
5The entire legislative agenda of the Umalab Ka party-list can be found at www.facebook.com/notes/
umalab-ka-partylist.
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Region (NCR), which comprises mainly Manila City and its suburbs, and 6 municipalities out of 90 available
from the neighboring Calabarzon region. On average, there are 58 and 25 barangays per municipality in
NCR and Calabarzon, respectively.6 The randomly selected cities from both regions are shown in the upper
panel of figure 2.
Second, for each municipality selected in its respective region (i.e., either NCR or Calabarzon), we
randomly chose three barangays and assign one of these to the treatment group and the remaining two
to the control group. At this second stage, and to avoid the risk of contamination between treatment and
control groups, we replaced a selected barangay and resampled another from the universe of barangays at
each municipality whenever the distance between any two selected barangays was less than 1.5 kilometers.
This procedure is repeated until no proximate barangays are selected.
Finally, we randomly assigned the selected cities to each of the two party-lists involved in the experi-
ment. The first three columns of Tables 1 and 2 present the sample of selected barangays for each munici-
pality and the treatment status for both Akbayan and Umalab Ka, respectively. The lower panel of Figure 2
shows, as an example, the three randomized barangays selected in the city of Baras, which was randomly
assigned to Umalab Ka.
In advance of the implementation of town hall meetings, one representative from the Center for Popu-
lar Empowerment (CPE), the NGO in charge of implementing the field experiment, conducted a series of
meetings with the party-list representatives to instruct them on the specifications of the protocol they had
to follow in treatment barangays. It is important to note that, from the initial random selection of munic-
ipalities and barangays, the research team of CPE made some adjustments in the sample selection due to
logistic difficulties encountered in the field while implementing the town hall meetings.
First, in the selected municipalities of Marikina and Valenzuela, the town hall meeting organizers
switched one of the originally selected control barangay for the treatment barangay.7 The reason behind
this decision was that the incumbent officials associated with another party-list (“Alay Buhay") were hostile
to the CPE research team and blocked the implementation of town hall meetings in the originally selected
treatment units. This issue made it impossible to organize and announce scheduled meetings on time at
other randomized selected barangays. In these cases, both party-lists used their presence at the originally
selected controls to organize the series of town hall meetings. Second, in the municipality of Luisiana, the
6NCR accounts for 49.54 percent of the population of both regions, while Calabarzon accounts for 51.46
percent.
7In Marikina, town hall meetings were implemented in the originally control unit, Barangka, instead of
the selected treatment barangay Concepcion Dos. In Valenzuela, town hall meetings were implemented in
Punturin instead of the originally selected treatment barangay Isla.
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Calabarzon
NCR (Metro Manila)
Figure 1: Philippines Regions: NCR and Calabarzon.
original treatment barangay, San Roque, could not be reached by the party-list Umalab Ka given the difficul-
ties posed by the local authorities to implement the meetings. Instead, meetings were held in the barangay
San Diego/San Antonio, chosen by the party-list representatives themselves. In section 1 of the supplemen-
tal appendix, we show that the experiment’s evaluation is robust to the observed selection of barangays.
First, we present estimates of the complier average causal effect of town hall meetings (CACE), which uses
the original random assignment as instrument for treatment status at the barangay level. The CACE is
similar in magnitude to the average treatment effect (ATE) we present in the paper. We also show that the
conclusions presented here remain unaltered when we exclude the municipalities of Luisiana, Marikina and
Valenzuela from the analysis. Note that in this exclusion we delete the entire randomization stratum (e.g.,
control and treatment units of a municipality), so that this deletion maintains the randomization-induced
balance in the sample.
3.2 Treatment Barangays
For the barangays assigned to the treatment group, a team of one organizer from CPE along with party-list
members (mainly nominees and leading officers) implemented two or three town hall meetings, each with
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Figure 2: Experiment’s Design. Sample Selection of Cities and Barangays.
around 40 participants, during the period between April 21 and May 9.8 A staff of approximately four CPE
staff members, along with party-list representatives, deployed teams a week in advance of the scheduled
meetings to inform potential voters door-to-door and in public areas about the location, date, and time
of the town hall meetings. On average, the town hall meetings lasted between 90–120 minutes, and were
divided in three stages: Introduction (10–15 minutes); deliberation (70–95 minutes); and resolution and
commitment (10 minutes).
At the introduction stage, the CPE representative gave a brief explanation of the purpose of the party-
list electoral system. In general, the audience was informed of the value of electing a party-list representa-
tive as differentiated from a district representative, mainly in that its objective is to give political represen-
tation to marginalized societal sectors.
Second, the party-list representative gave an introductory speech containing its platform and program-
matic statement, following as a guideline a homogenous statement previously designed by the party-list
officials and transmitted to its nominees. Akbayan’s representative explained the services that the party
provides to its members and its legislative accomplishments. The party-list representative highlighted Ak-
8In the case of Akbayan, the National Secretary General Conrad Castillo coordinated the town hall
meeting implementation with CPE and instructed the party’s nominees about the protocols to follow. In
the case of Umalab Ka, National Secretary General Rosel Vargas coordinated the town hall meeting imple-
mentation with CPE, but also personally led all the town hall meetings.
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Table 1: Turnout for the National and Party-List Elections (Umalab Ka Barangays)
City Barangay Status Turnout (National) Turnout (PL) Vote
Baras Concepcion Control 80.30 62.51 1.70
Baras San Juan Treated 76.13 54.83 0.78
Baras Santiago Control 79.98 58.81 0.00
Imus Anabu II-F Treated 62.30 52.75 0.13
Imus Alapan II-A Control 77.16 64.00 0.00
Imus Mariano Espeleta II Control 55.88 47.92 0.00
Los Banos Lalakay Treated 81.32 69.98 0.94
Los Banos Putho Control 83.93 68.50 0.00
Los Banos Bayog Control 83.64 66.86 0.00
Paranaque Baclaran Treated 68.04 55.55 0.16
Paranaque San Dionisio Control 72.81 59.81 0.06
Paranaque B.F Homes Control 72.75 58.54 0.18
Pasay Barangay 191 Control 78.13 64.11 0.00
Pasay Barangay 183 Control 72.12 62.22 0.00
Pasay Barangay 178 Treated 73.92 59.76 0.00
Pateros San Pedro Control 76.66 69.79 0.00
Pateros San Roque Control 77.34 62.87 0.07
Pateros San Rosario-Silangan Treated 73.76 59.61 2.25
Valenzuela Karuhatan Control 77.82 68.14 0.09
Valenzuela Isla Control 57.91 50.10 0.00
Valenzuela Punturin Treated 79.63 68.83 1.36
Mean 74.36 61.21 0.37
S.D. 7.68 6.43 0.65
bayan’s role in passing the Responsible Parenthood Law, explaining how the law would help marginalized
women. At this stage, Umalab Ka representatives stated that, if elected, they would push for the creation
of laws aimed at protecting the urban poor, such as legislation to address price stabilizations on basic com-
modities during natural disasters and laws to give job security to informal workers.
The deliberation stage usually consisted of several rounds of questions/comments, in which partici-
pants were encouraged to suggest amendments to the original policies presented by the party-lists and to
give new proposals that could potentially be included in the party-list platform. Town hall meeting partic-
ipants had no restrictions to debate the policy proposals among themselves and with the candidates. For
example, at a meeting conducted by Akbayan in the barangay of San Diego in the city of Luisiana, a young
participant raised the concern that it was common for parties to make a lot of promises, but he wanted
to know exactly what, if elected, Akbayan would do. The party representative clarified that, as members
of Congress, they would be involved in crafting meaningful policies and would be active in the budget
process as it is determined by Congress at the national level. At another meeting conducted by Umalab
Ka in the barangay Santo Rosario-Silangan, a woman raised the issue of land property that affected many
households in that barangay. She shared her fear that her home would be demolished, as she did not have
a property title. The Umalab Ka representative emphasized that one of their main objectives, if elected, was
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Table 2: Turnout for the National and Party-List Elections (Akbayan Barangays)
City Barangay Status Turnout (National) Turnout(PL) Vote
Luisiana Barangay Zone VI Control - 65.05 11.57
Luisiana San Salvador Control 78.17 55.28 1.59
Luisiana San Diego/San Antonio Treated 82.47 62.19 10.79
Malate Barangay 738 Treated 76.62 67.82 6.83
Malate Barangay 190 Control 72.39 60.83 3.51
Malate Barangay 609 Control 75.84 63.32 3.45
Marikina Parang Control 74.34 64.42 4.85
Marikina Barangka Treated 73.62 64.80 3.75
Marikina Concepcion Dos Control 73.83 63.99 3.91
Quezon City Escopa 4 Control 82.25 66.86 10.56
Quezon City Tatalon Control 69.79 60.61 8.22
Quezon City Payatas Treated 72.76 59.98 4.34
Sta Maria Cabooan Control - 55.24 2.68
Sta Maria Tungkod Treated 79.63 54.86 5.91
Sta Maria Masinao Control 83.92 53.33 1.47
Taguig Hagonoy Control - 55.28 4.28
Taguig Upper Bicutan Control 55.96 45.85 3.10
Taguig Ususan Treated 60.36 47.92 8.06
Mean 74.13 59.31 5.49
S.D. 7.7 6.35 3.15
Note: No available general election figures for the barangays of Cabooan, Zone VI and Hagonoy.
to reform the Urban Development and Housing Act to better regulate informal settling and help women
like her.
At the resolution and commitment stage, the CPE representative summarized the main proposals of the
party-list and the main issues raised during deliberation. At this stage, the party-list representative made a
commitment to the participants to transmit the summary report of the meeting to the party-list leaders and
candidates with their suggestions and proposals.
It is worth emphasizing that in each of the town hall meetings implemented in the treatment barangays,
there was no cash or any other type of valuable gift distributed to the meeting attendees. Both party-lists
only distributed flyers and attached posters and banners at the meeting locations.
3.3 Control Barangays
In those barangays assigned to the control group, there were no instructions to party-list representatives
on what campaign strategy to follow. The only restriction was that town hall meetings were not to be
implemented. In fact, both party-lists followed the “business-as-usual” strategy, which they have followed
elsewhere to mobilize voters.
The only relevant distinction between control “barangays” and those not selected in the randomization
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protocol is that in the latter, we were able to monitor the presence and campaign efforts of both party-lists
involved in the experiment. CPE engaged 4 field researchers to monitor the campaign strategy of party-lists
at each control barangay. The reports from the field indicate that both parties deployed mobile propaganda
teams using a sound system roving within the barangays asking people for their vote. In addition, party-
lists followed a door-to-door campaign, in which party-list volunteers distributed flyers to households.
Finally, party-lists organized around one public event in each control barangay to mobilize voters.
These events took the form of marches that culminated in rallies. The attendees consisted mainly of party
members. The average size of these rallies usually exceeded 100 participants, notably higher than any of
the town hall meetings implemented in treatment barangays. In terms of the interaction between candidate
and voters, party rallies are what we call “one-way communication" campaigns, in which only party-list
leaders engaged the audience with a message containing the party’s policy platform, without the possibility
for attendees to speak directly to the candidate.
4 Data
We use two types of data for the evaluation of the field experiment. To quantify the treatment effect of
the presence of town hall meetings on voting behavior, we use official data reported by the Philippines’
Commission of Elections (COMELEC) at the precinct level, a lower level electoral unit than the barangay.
We aggregate this data to construct barangay-level measures of party-list turnout and vote shares for each
of the party-lists involved in the experiment.
Tables 1 and 2 present the official information on turnout and vote shares at the general and at the party-
list elections for the barangays assigned to Akbayan and Umalab Ka, respectively. The turnout figures are
calculated as the ratio of total voters in the election to registered voters at the barangay level. On average,
turnout for the general election was around 75 percent, whereas the turnout for the party-list election was
around 60 percent, which is equivalent to 80 percent of the national election.
Figure 3 presents the number of potential voters who attended at least one town hall meeting in treat-
ment barangays as a proportion of both the number of registered voters and the party-list voters for the
2013 election at the barangay level, which were obtained from the town-hall meetings’ proceedings. On av-
erage, meeting attendees accounted for 5 percent of potential voters and 8 percent of party-list voters. There
is considerable variation, however, in the number of meeting attendees across barangays. On highly popu-
lated areas such as the barangays of Payatas and Ususan, meetings attendees accounted for just 0.5 percent
of party-list voters, whereas in barangays like Barangay 738 or Lalakay, meeting attendees accounted for
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more than 25 percent of the total number of party-list voters.
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Figure 3: Proportion of Town Hall Meetings’ Attendees. Number of meeting attendees is
obtained from the attendance sheets CPE collected at every town-hall meeting. The number
of registered voters is obtained from the COMELEC official statistics of the 2010 legislative
election. The number of party-list voters is also obtained from COMELEC, for the 2013 election.
The red dashed lines depict the mean attendance proportion across barangays.
Second, to estimate heterogenous treatment effects of town hall meetings and potential mechanisms,
we analyze individual-level data for treatment and control barangays using a post-electoral survey that
CPE implemented two weeks after the election in a subset of municipalities where town hall meetings were
implemented.9 This survey covers standard demographic characteristics, self-reported voting behavior,
town hall meeting attendance, and political attitudes for a total of 1200 Filipino citizens of voting age (40
citizens in each of 30 barangays).10
For this survey, CPE followed a “random walk” and quota sampling procedure, in which 40 respon-
dents were selected from each sampled barangay. In control and treatment barangays, enumerators sam-
pled households following a “random walk” starting from the Barangay’s town hall in control areas and
from the location of the town-hall meetings in treatment barangays.
Given its non-representative sampling procedure, the post-electoral survey does not reflect the sociode-
mographic characteristics of potential voters at the barangay-level. While 9 percent of survey respondents
9The municipalities that were excluded from the survey analysis because CPE did not sample respon-
dents in both treatment and control barangays are Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria.
10The effective sample that we use in the analysis is of 902 citizens, which excludes those respondents
who did not give a valid response for the turnout and town hall meeting attendance questions.
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in treatment barangays reported having attended at least one town hall meeting, which is almost identical
to the 8 percent of party-list voters who actually attended at least one town hall meeting, there is significant
variation in self-reported attendance, going from zero percent in Payatas to around 50 percent in San Juan.
The presence of sampling biases, along with the lack of census data at the barangay level, prevents us
from directly comparing the aggregate electoral returns to the individual-level survey responses. Never-
theless, the information we can extract from voter responses about their socio-economic and demographic
characteristics, as well as about their political attitudes and behavior ultimately makes the post-electoral
survey a valuable source of information to assess under what conditions deliberative campaigns were more
effective for delivering a political platform to voters.
5 Barangay Level Results
We evaluate the effect of the implementation of town hall meetings (i.e., treatment) on aggregate voting
behavior at the barangay-level on two main electoral outcomes: party-list turnout (as a proportion of regis-
tered voters) and vote shares (as a proportion of total party-list votes) obtained from official results provided
by COMELEC.
The random assignment process of the campaign treatment makes identification of the average treat-
ment effect (ATE) of the presence of town hall meetings on aggregate electoral returns straightforward us-
ing the following regression of the observed electoral return Y in barangay j = 1, . . . , J, within municipality
k = 1, . . . , K, on a treatment dummy, Tp, that equals 1 if party p ∈ {Akbayan, Umalab Ka} implemented
town hall meetings and zero, otherwise:
Yj,k = β0 + δk + β1Tp + ej,k, (1)
where β1 is our coefficient of interest, as it captures the ATE. The parameter δk captures strata fixed effects
and e is an idiosyncratic error term. To conduct inference, we present uncertainty estimates of the ATE
under a non-parametric permutation test (Efron and Tibshirani 1994). We focus on the statistical inference
under randomization or permutation resampling, as it does not rely on random sampling from a known
population or on any distributional assumption of the quantity of interest, making it less sensitive to the
small number of sampled barangays. Instead, we take advantage of the randomized design itself to recover
the test statistic of interest directly from the data, while providing a measure about the internal validity
of our experiment. This procedure computes the distribution for the null hypothesis of no “deliberation”
effect for all barangays and calculates a p-value for any within-city permutation of the treatment status that
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we might have observed in the experiment.11
Before presenting the aggregate results for turnout and vote shares, Table 3 shows that the random-
ization of town-hall meetings succesfully achieved balance in available pre-treatment official statistics at
the barangay level. As can be seen from the large p-values under randomization, treatment and control
barangays are well balanced according to barangays’ population, the proportion of registered and female
voters, as well as to whether the barangay is classified as urban or rural.12 Although ideally we would
like to show balance on a broader set of pre-treatment covariates, such as turnout and vote shares in previ-
ous elections, the COMELEC does not have publicly available electoral data at the barangay level for past
party-list elections. Similarly, census data besides population is not available for lower units of dissagrega-
tion than municipalities.
Table 3: Pre-treatment Balance Test at the Barangay Level
Dependent variable:
Population Registered Voters Female Voters Urban Barangay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATE 2.201 −0.054 −0.028 −0.154
p = 0.782 p = 0.370 p = 0.371 p = 0.181
Control 16.838∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗
p = 0.003 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Observations 39 39 39 39
R2 0.002 0.021 0.021 0.032
Note: ∗p≤0.05.
Inference for the ATE under randomization of the treatment.
Permutation p-values for ATE.
11To compute the sampling distribution under the sharp null of no effect, we draw a binary treatment
assignment from the empirical distribution of the original assigned barangays without replacement. Then,
we compute the difference-in-means between treated and untreated barangays. We repeat this procedure
on 1000 samples, randomly shuffling the treatment status within each municipality. In this way, we can
estimate the fraction of simulated difference-in-means that exceeds the observed difference-in-means (i.e.,
permutation p-values).
12Barangay population is in thousands. Balance for registered and female voters is estimated as a propor-
tion of barangay population. urban is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 2010 Philippines
Census denotes the barangay as urban and zero as rural.
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The estimates of the average treatment effects for turnout and vote shares for each treatment party-list
are presented in Table 4 and graphically depicted in Figure 4 with respect to the empirical null distribution.
First, looking at the results on party-list turnout, we can see that the presence of town hall meetings does
not mobilize voters to turn out to vote in the party-list race. However, conditional on casting a ballot, the
presence of town hall meetings has a positive and statistically significant effect on aggregate vote shares
when we pool both party-lists together. These results suggest that the vote shares for treatment parties
increased around 1.13 percent in barangays in which party-lists implemented a deliberative campaign,
compared to the baseline of around 2.36 percent with the “one-way" communication campaign. This result
translates into an overall electoral return of a deliberative campaign of around 50 percent.
When we split the sample by treatment party-list, we can see that both treatment effects are positive,
although statistically significant only in the case of Umalab Ka. In particular, Akbayan was rewarded, on
average, with a 1.7 percent higher vote share in treatment barangays than in control barangays. Similarly,
Umalab Ka obtained an increase of 0.65 percent in its vote share in those barangays where town-hall meet-
ings were implemented, which represents more than a fourfold increase with respect to its vote share in
control barangays (i.e., 0.15 percent). These results are not only considerable in magnitude with respect
to baseline scenarios, but also politically meaningful. In the case of Akbayan, this estimated return, if ex-
trapolated at the national level, would directly translate into an additional seat in Congress, something this
party-list was not able to secure in the past election.13
The previous ATE estimates, albeit informative of the aggregate effect of town hall meetings on electoral
returns, do not allow us to account for potential heterogenous effects across our sample of municipalities.
We capture differential effects across municipalities by computing the within-municipality expected differ-
ence in potential outcomes under the presence of town hall meetings, E[Yj,0,[k] − E[Yj,1,[k]]. We estimate this
effect with the following hierarchical regression:
Yj,k = αj[k] + β j[k]Tp + ej,k. (2)
Here, β j[k] is our coefficient of interest that varies by city and e denotes again an idiosyncratic error term.
Inference for the within-municipality effects is provided assuming they are normally distributed around
13In section 1 of the supplemental appendix, we estimate the CACE, which account for the deviation in
the treatment status from the original sampling design in three barangays. We find that Umalab Ka obtained
a similar electoral return of 0.62 percent in those barangays that complied with the original randomization
protocol. When we exclude the three municipalities with deviations from the original randomization pro-
tocol, the ATE for Umalab Ka is 0.54 percent (see also section 1 in the appendix).
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Table 4: Average Treatment Effect on Electoral Returns at the Barangay Level
Dependent variable:
Turnout Vote (Overall) Vote (Akbayan) Vote (Umalab Ka)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATE −0.635 1.126∗ 1.680 0.651∗
p = 0.657 p = 0.050 p = 0.140 p = 0.018
Control 60.549∗ 2.357∗ 4.932∗ 0.150
p = 0.000 p = 0.002 p = 0.0001 p = 0.351
Observations 39 39 18 21
R2 0.002 0.025 0.067 0.231
Note: ∗p≤0.05.
Inference for the ATE under randomization of the treatment.
Permutation p-values for ATE.
the ATE (i.e., β1 in equation (1)) with variance σ2β.
The varying effects of the presence of town hall meetings on vote shares by municipality are presented
in Table 5.
Table 5: Treatment Effect on Electoral Returns by Municipality
Akbayan Control Treatment Difference Umalabka Control Treatment Difference
Luisiana 5.55 6.55 1.01 Baras 0.15 0.78 0.63∗
Malate 4.31 6.67 2.36∗ Imus 0.15 0.34 0.18
Marikina 4.76 6.63 1.87 Los Banos 0.15 0.90 0.75∗
Quezon City 6.87 6.42 -0.45 Paranaque 0.15 0.36 0.20
Santa Maria 3.73 6.73 3.00∗ Pasay 0.15 0.25 0.09
Taguig 4.37 6.67 2.29 Pateros 0.14 1.80 1.66∗
Valenzuela 0.15 1.19 1.04∗
Mean 4.93 6.61 1.68 Mean 0.15 0.80 0.65
S.D. 1.12 0.11 1.23 S.D. 0.01 0.56 0.56
Note: ∗p ≤ 0.05.
Inference for the within-city effect assuming normally distributed effects.
As can be observed from these results, in all 13 municipalities except one, Quezon City, the effect of
deliberative campaigns is positive. Nonetheless, there seems to be important differences in both the mag-
nitude and the uncertainty of these effects across municipalities.
For Akbayan, although the overall effect of town hall meetings is not statistically significant, the pres-
ence of town hall meetings on vote shares is statistically different from zero in 2 out of the 6 municipalities
19
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Figure 4: Permutation Distribution for the Average Treatment Effect. The dashed red line
indicate the observed ATE. The distribution is constructed from 1000 within-municipality re-
samples from the observed outcomes.
(i.e. Malate and Santa Maria). In Santa Maria, for example, Akbayan’s vote share in the treatment barangay
was 1.8 times larger than in control barangays.
In the case of Umalab Ka, the results from this exercise indicate that the presence of town hall meetings
is associated with a statistically significant increase in its vote shares in 4 of the 7 cities where this party
campaigned implementing town hall meetings (i.e., Baras, Los Banos, Pateros, and Valenzuela). In Valen-
zuela, deliberative campaigns were the most effective for Umalab Ka, where its vote share in the treatment
barangay was almost 7 times larger than in the control group.
6 Individual-Level Results
The estimates obtained from the previous analysis at the aggregate level indicate that the presence of de-
liberative campaigns, here in the form of town-hall meetings, is indeed an effective way to appeal to voters
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on Election Day, as it provides political parties with better electoral returns than traditional “business-as-
usual” strategies, in which voters are mere observers of the politician’s behavior during the campaign.
However, these results do not give us an understanding of the type of voters who are most persuaded by
the implementation of town-hall meetings, nor of the specific channels that drive these voters to support
parties that implement a “deliberative” campaign.
In the remainder of the paper, we use the post-electoral survey that contains turnout and vote declara-
tions, as well as other political and socio-demographic characteristics in treatment and control barangays to
estimate heterogeneity in causal effects across different subsets of respondents and provide some evidence
on the causal mechanisms behind aggregate voting behavior.14 The price we pay by using individual data
besides the un-representativeness of the survey at the barangay-level, is the fact that individual outcomes
are self-reported, which might misrepresent actual choices.
An important concern we are able to address regarding the individual-level data is the potential pres-
ence of pre-treatment covariate imbalance between treatment and control barangays. This problem could
be a source of selection bias in our analysis that arises from different characteristics between respondents
from treatment barangays with respect to those in control barangays, which might affect voting behavior,
other than through the presence of town hall meetings.
To assess balance on the individual respondents of the post-electoral survey, we implement a matching
estimation of respondents between treatment and control groups using sociodemographic characteristics
obtained from the survey questionnaire, as detailed in section 2 of the supplemental appendix, such as
gender, income, education, age, religion, marital status, and linguistic group.15
Table 6 shows balanced statistics from the empirical distribution of pre-treatment covariates such as
mean and standard deviation by treatment status. It also presents the difference between the median values
of the empirical distributions for each of these covariates. As one can see from this summary information, it
is reassuring that the socio-demographic characteristics included do not seem to differ between respondents
14The survey questions used to generate all the individual-level outcomes can be found in section 5 of
the supplemental appendix.
15gender is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is female. income is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the monthly income is above 10K pesos, and zero otherwise. education is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if education is above a high school diploma, and zero otherwise.
age is a categorical variable with 4 brackets, [18-29 years old], [30-39 years old], [40-49 years old], [50 years
old and older]. religion is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is Roman Catholic.
status is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is married. linguistic is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is from the Tagalog linguistic group.
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in treatment and control barangays.
Table 6: Balanced Statistics of Pre-Treatment Covariates to Predict Treatment at the
Individual Level
Means Treated Means Control SD Control Mean Diff eQQ Med
distance 0.39 0.38 0.04 0.01 0.01
gender 0.61 0.60 0.49 0.01 0.00
income 0.08 0.10 0.30 -0.02 0.00
age 2.63 2.73 1.10 -0.10 0.00
religion 0.89 0.90 0.30 -0.01 0.00
status 0.65 0.72 0.45 -0.07 0.00
linguistic 0.89 0.87 0.34 0.02 0.00
education 1.31 1.30 0.46 0.01 0.00
Note: The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.
The variables gender, religion, status, and linguistic are matched exactly.
Values of eQQ Med around zero mean that the median empirical distribution of the variable in
the treated group does not differ from the median empirical distribution of the variable in the
control group.
Figure 5 summarizes the above results by estimating a propensity score of the treatment status condi-
tional on the pre-treatment covariates.16 This technique is helpful because if treatment and control groups
have identical propensity score distributions, the pre-treatment covariates will be balanced between the
two groups (Ho et al. 2007). The balance of our post-election survey can be confirmed by looking at Figure
5, which shows a very similar density of the estimated propensity score by treatment status. In section 2
of the supplemental appendix, we show that our results are robust to adjusting for the set of pre-treatment
covariates contained in the individual survey.
16We match individuals in treatment and control barangays using a “nearest-neighbor” matching tech-
nique with replacement and a probit model for the probability of treatment. That is, Pr(Ti,j = 1|Xi,j) =
Φ(Xijβ), where Pr(Ti,j = 1|Xi,j) denotes the probability that respondent i in barangay j lives in a treatment
barangay (Ti,j = 1) conditional on the vector of pre-treatment covariates Xi,j. Φ(·) denotes the c.d.f. of the
normal distribution.
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Figure 5: Kernel Density and Q-Q Plot of the Survey Sample. On the left panel, the red line
depicts the density of the propensity score for individuals in control barangays, whereas the
blue line depicts the density of the propensity score for individuals in treatment barangays.
On the right panel, the red dots represent empirical Q-Q estimates for the survey sample. The
45-degree line indicates identical distribution and the dotted lines indicate the width of the
propensity score range.
6.1 Intent-to-Treat Effect of Town Hall Meetings on Voting Behavior
The randomization of the campaign strategy makes campaign assignment, T, independent of any pre-
treatment characteristics of voters from treatment and control groups. However, compliance behavior to
attend the meetings is not randomly assigned and could be affected by the treatment itself. For example,
it seems reasonable to imagine a voter in a treatment barangay whose unobserved interest in the political
campaigns might influence both her decision to attend a town hall meeting and her propensity to cast a
vote for one of the treatment parties. In fact, for this subset of voters, attendance does not give us a measure
of the informational effect of the town hall meeting as a deliberative institution.
In addition, as we already mentioned in the introduction, voters who did not attend any town hall
meetings could still be influenced by their assignment if they obtain information about the meeting pro-
ceedings from engaged voters who participated in at least one meeting and decided to share this political
knowledge.
Given the self selection of meeting attendees and potential spillover effects to non-compliers, we use
the post-electoral survey to estimate the identified reduced-form intent-to-treat effect (ITT), as well as het-
erogeneous treatment effects of the presence of town hall meetings using citizens’ characteristics contained
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in the post-electoral survey.
Let i = 1, . . . , N denote a voter in barangay j within municipality k where party-list p is campaigning.
Analogous to equation (1) for the aggregate effect, the ITT effect with individual data can be identified with
the following regression:
Yp,j,i = β0,p,k + β1Tp,j + ep,j,i, (3)
where ep,j,i is the error term clustered at the barangay level. All of the individual ITT effects adjust for the
over-sampling of meeting attendees via inverse probability weighting, where the adjustment in treatment
barangays is given by the proportion of survey (self-reported) attendees to actual barangay attendees, ob-
tained from town hall meetings’ attendance sheets. As reference, section 3 of the supplemental appendix
presents the unadjusted individual results, which over-represent self-reported attendees. As with aggregate
data, inference over the ITT effects is done under a non-parametric permutation test that uses the two-stage
cluster randomization design to estimate empirical p-values for the ITT effects.
Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (3) with the individual level data. Although
absolute magnitudes of treatment effects are not comparable between aggregate and individual results, we
can see that, consistent with the aggregate results, the individual propensity to turn out to vote was not
notably affected by the presence of deliberative campaigns. In contrast, the presence of town hall meetings
affected overall vote choice positively (although the overall effect does not achieve statistical significance
p = 0.098), increasing the probability of voting for the party around 60% with respect to the control group.17
When we split the results by party, we find, as with the aggregate data, that the positive electoral returns of
town hall meetings are statistically significant only for Umalab Ka. In the survey, the propensity to vote for
Umalab Ka is around 4.5 times larger under the presence of town hall meetings than in control barangays.18
6.2 Heterogeneous Treatment by Income, Education, and Gender.
As we mentioned in the introduction, by fixing the platform’s content that parties delivered in treatment
and control barangays, we are able to assess the effectiveness of deliberation conditional on a particular
campaign message. This feature of the experiment allows us to test the effectiveness of town hall meetings
for the subset of voters at whom the campaign platforms are aimed at.
17In comparison with a 50% increase in vote share using official aggregate data.
18Using the official aggregate data, vote shares in treatment barangays are 4.3 larger than in control
barangays.
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Table 7: Intention to Treat Effect on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level
Dependent variable:
Turnout Vote (Overall) Vote (Akbyan) Vote (Umalab-Ka)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATE −3.172 6.126 3.479 3.594∗
p = 0.664 p = 0.098 p = 0.140 p = 0.025
Control 81.994∗ 10.345∗ 18.092∗ 0.810
p = 0.000 p = 0.031 p = 0.019 p = 0.305
Observations 902 739 417 322
R2 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.012
Note: ∗p ≤ 0.05.
Inference for the ITT under randomization of the treatment.
Permutation p-values.
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.
First, we assess whether there is a differential effect of town hall meetings on informal sector workers
and the urban poor, for which Umalab Ka’s platform was designed. Although the post-electoral survey did
not ask respondents to provide information on their employment status, we use their self-reported level of
income as a crude proxy for informality by relying on the labor economics literature, which has consistently
found that in developing countries, such as the Philippines, workers employed in the untaxed, unregulated
sector, tend to have lower income than their counterparts in the formal sector (Amaral and Quintin 2006;
Maloney 1999).
Second, we condition the effect of town hall meetings on respondents’ gender to test whether the effect
of the deliberative strategy is different for women, who are the primary focus of Akbayan’s platform, as it
emphasized primarily the rights of women in the labor force.
To obtain a differential ITT effect of town hall meetings by income and gender, we estimate an interac-
tion model of the form:
Yi,j,k = β0 + δk + β1Tp + β2Zi,j,k + β3(Tp × Zi,j,k) + ei,j,k, (4)
where Zj,i denotes the pre-treatment conditioning variable (either income or gender).19 δk are city fixed
effects and ei,j,k is an idiosyncratic error clustered at the barangay level. Figure 6 graphically depicts the
19Section 2 in the supplemental appendix shows that estimates of equation 4 are robust to adding addi-
tional pre-treatment covariates.
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marginal effects of town hall meetings conditioned by income and gender, along with 95% confidence
intervals.
The upper panel of Figure 6 shows that, consistent with the platform of Umalab Ka, which emphasized
policy legislation in favor of the urban poor, the effect of town hall meetings is positive and statistically
significant exclusively for low-income respondents (p− value < 0.001). In fact, the presence of town hall
meetings does not seem to exert any effect on the propensity to vote for Umalab Ka for voters with an
income larger than 10, 000 pesos. In the case of Akbayan’s platform, as expected from their platform mes-
sage, we find no differential treatment effect by income on their electoral returns, as we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the treatment effect is the same for low and high income voters when Akbayan uses a
deliberative campaign to communicate its platform (p− value = 0.17).
The results of estimating differential treatment effects by gender are shown in the lower panel of Figure
6. We can see that, consistent with Akbayan’s main message, the positive impact of deliberative campaigns
on electoral returns is driven by women, as the ITT effect is only positive among female voters (p− value <
0.001). When we look at the results for those barangays where Umalab Ka was the treatment party, we find,
unexpectedly, the opposite result, as positive electoral returns of “deliberative” campaigns are found only
among men (p− value < 0.01), even though Umalab Ka’s platform did not emphasize gender differences.
Overall, the conditional effects of town hall meetings are consistent with the fact that the main recipients
of the proposed policies, namely women and the urban poor, directly rewarded the party-lists that proposed
these policies to a higher extent when these platforms were delivered through a deliberative campaign.20
As the platform content is the same across treatment conditions, these results imply that the consequences
of programmatic policies are better understood when voters debate with candidates compared to the case
where voters just listen passively to the politician’s message.
20Consistent with the null average treatment effects for party-list turnout, section 4 in the supplemental
appendix shows that party-list turnout is not affected by the presence of town hall meetings, irrespective of
respondents’ level of income or gender.
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6.3 Causal Mechanisms: The Impact of Deliberation on Attitudes about
Income and Gender Inequality
Having found conditional effects of deliberative campaigns on voting behavior for the main beneficiaries of
party-lists’ platforms, we turn to explore whether these effects are driven by a change in citizens’ attitudes
regarding the issues emphasized by party-lists during the campaign. In the case of Umalab Ka, we compute
differences in attitudes by treatment using the entire battery of survey responses to questions on poverty
and income inequality. In this way, we get closer to measuring the main policy issue emphasized in Umalak
Ba’s platform. Similarly for Akbayan, we compute attitudinal differences by treatment on the whole set of
survey responses to questions related to gender discrimination and sexism. In this way, we assess whether
Akbayan’s message induced a higher awareness of gender inequalities and changed voters’ attitudes when
platforms are transmitted in town hall meetings versus “one-way” communication devices.
To measure voters’ attitudes on issues emphasized by Umalab Ka in their platform, we found three
questions that measure the relevance of poverty, the income gap between the rich and poor, and a poverty-
reducing policy. For poverty and income gap the survey captures how intensely voters agree with the
statement that each of these issues is one of the Philippines’ most important problems. For the poverty-
reducing policy, the survey asks to rank the policy they would like to be impemented the most among a
conditional cash transfer program, an anti-corruption policy or an increase in public investment.21
Voters’ attitudes on gender discrimination and sexism come from five survey questions where respon-
dents were asked to show their degree of agreement or disagreement with respect to statements involving
gender differences in quality of House representatives, female representation in politics, gender inequality,
gender discrimination in the labor market, and sexual harassment towards women.22
To measure average treatment effects, we follow Anderson [2008] and first orient each individual out-
come, so that the positive direction implies more agreement. Next, we demean all outcomes and standard-
ize them with respect to the control group mean and standard deviation to use a comparable scale. Since we
have multiple measures for each issue, we construct summary indices in the form of standardized inverse-
covariance-weighted averages of the outcomes. These indices estimate an optimal linear combination of the
individual measures to reflect a common latent factor. By pooling several measures of an issue into a single
index, these indices are robust to overtesting; they also test for whether an issue has a “general effect”; and
21Section 5 in the supplemental appendix shows the questions used to extract the poverty-related attitu-
dinal variables.
22The five statements used to generate gender-related attitudinal variables can also be seen in section 5
of the supplemental appendix.
28
finally, they have more statistical power than individual-level tests.
Table 8 presents the results regarding the effects of town hall meetings on attitudes towards poverty
for both Akbayan and Umalab Ka barangays. The results for Akbayan, presented in the upper panel of
this table, show that voters’ attitudes towards poverty and corruption are largely unchanged when Ak-
bayan implements town hall meetings compared to control areas. This null effect is summarized based on
the index that combines information from the three indicators (column (1)), as well as from each individ-
ual indicator. This result is consistent with the platform content of Akbayan’s campaign, which relegated
poverty to a second-order issue, and instead, stressed women empowerment and gender equality as their
main messages.
Table 8: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Poverty
Dependent variable:
Index Poverty CCT Income Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Akbayan Treatment:
ATE 0.018 0.019 −0.008 −0.019
p = 0.334 p = 0.420 p = 0.486 p = 0.412
Control −0.133 −0.070 −0.191 −0.076
p = 0.173 p = 0.696 p = 0.135 p = 0.676
Observations 382 400 400 388
R2 0.142 0.140 0.156 0.110
Umalab Ka Treatment:
ATE 0.142∗ 0.184 0.210 −0.006
p = 0.050 p = 0.075 p = 0.186 p = 0.235
Control 0.093 0.056 0.105 0.115
p = 0.134 p = 0.549 p = 0.354 p = 0.093
Observations 434 439 439 441
R2 0.118 0.117 0.117 0.116
Note: ∗p < 0.05.
Inference for the ITT under randomization of the treatment.
Permutation p-values.
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.
In contrast, we find evidence of a positive general effect of town-hall meetings on poverty-related at-
titudes when Umalab Ka is the party-list campaigning. Column (1) of the lower panel of Table 8 suggests
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that the presence of town hall meetings increases citizens’ awareness on poverty-related issues by 0.142
standard deviations with respect to the control. This effect is mainly driven by respondents in treatment
barangays stating that poverty is the main problem in the Philippines.
The above results, together with the positive treatment effects on voting for low-income voters, suggest
that deliberative campaigns were more effective than “one-way” communication technologies in deliver-
ing Umalab Ka’s platform and affecting the behavior of poor voters. whereas, as expected, overall attitudes
towards poverty were not significantly influenced when Akbayan used deliberative campaigns to commu-
nicate its feminist platform.
Table 9: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Gender
Dependent variable:
Index Female Rep. Female Pol. Equality Discrimination Harassment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Akbayan Treatment:
ATE 0.328∗ −0.843 0.286 0.679∗ 0.481∗ 0.608∗
p = 0.005 p = 1.000 p = 0.132 p = 0.005 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Control −0.004 0.099 0.040 −0.145 −0.178∗ 0.116∗
p = 0.946 p = 0.234 p = 0.796 p = 0.232 p = 0.000 p = 0.019
Observations 543 567 558 566 564 567
R2 0.101 0.116 0.018 0.083 0.045 0.058
Umalab Ka Treatment:
ATE 0.057 0.158 −0.171 0.141 0.194 −0.063
p = 0.396 p = 0.371 p = 0.902 p = 0.420 p = 0.132 p = 0.613
Control −0.022 −0.041 −0.088 0.055 0.085 −0.119∗
p = 0.419 p = 0.683 p = 0.441 p = 0.629 p = 0.088 p = 0.015
Observations 423 449 446 447 446 437
R2 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001
Note: ∗p < 0.05.
Inference for the ITT under randomization of the treatment.
Permutation p-values.
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.
Table 9 displays the results of estimating the effect of town hall meetings on attitudes towards gender
discrimination. As in the case of poverty-related issues, we split the sample into Akbayan and Umalab Ka
barangays. In this case, if deliberative campaigns increase opposition towards gender inequality and sex-
ism, we should expect a positive treatment effect. As we can see in the upper panel of this table, the results
for Akbayan are consistent with this expected effect. Based on the evidence of the summary index (column
(1)), the presence of town hall meetings increases awareness on gender-related issues by 0.328 standard de-
viation units. This attitudinal change on gender-related issues is mainly driven by a positive and significant
increment in three individual components: gender inequality, discrimination, and harassment.
When we look at differential gender attitudes by treatment status in those barangays where Umalab
Ka campaigned, we find a null effect of town hall meetings on the summary index, as well as on each of
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its individual components. This is consistent with Umalab Ka’s priority on poverty and income inequality,
regardless of gender differences.
This evidence, along with the electoral returns from women’s votes for Akbayan and from the poor
for Umalab Ka, is consistent with the fact that, when compared to communication strategies based on
the delivery of party propaganda and rally speeches, the “deliberative” campaign is better able to change
voters’ attitudes on gender and poverty issues for Akbayan and Umalab Ka, respectively. This attitudinal
change, in turn, increased the voting numbers of the main beneficiaries of the party-lists’ proposed policies.
Together, these results suggest that exposure to town hall meetings led to substantial improvements in
voter knowledge on those issues emphasized by party-lists during the campaign. Voters acted on Election
Day based on this increased knowledge and attitudinal change by selecting the candidate that offered a
platform closer to their preferred policy.
7 Conclusion
We present deliberative campaigns as a political strategy that can provide higher electoral returns to self-
interested politicians in comparison to “one-way” communication technologies. Beyond the electoral re-
turns of implementing town hall meetings, we have shown that the presence of deliberative forums are
helpful in increasing voters’ knowledge regarding relevant policy issues. The practical impact of deliber-
ative forums, like the one presented in this paper, adds to the existing normative arguments in favor of
deliberative institutions, which encourage the active engagement of citizens in the decision-making pro-
cess.
We show that, when it comes to the polling booth, the average voter rewards the deliberative campaign
with a meaningful increase in electoral returns. This result is conditional on the observed strategies of
the remaining parties that did not participate in the experiment. However, even if other parties switch to
deliberative town hall meetings in the future to gain an electoral edge and change the vote distribution
across parties, still we have shown that deliberative campaigns seem to be more effective in accurately
delivering the content of a campaign platform to voters compared to “one-way” communication strategies.
Future work should focus on understanding the informational effects of town hall meetings by system-
atically analyzing its meeting proceedings. We need to disentangle whether the informational effects of
deliberative campaigns arise mainly because voters acquire meaningful political knowledge from debating
with politicians about the platform content (i.e., vertical communication) or because voters engage each
other and acquire information from other voters that persists until election day (i.e., horizontal communi-
31
cation).
In addition, further research should trace more carefully the process of information sharing and voting
contagion from attendees to other potential voters and, more precisely, attempt to understand the channels
through which meeting attendees share this information. Finally, we need to identify the social networks
of attendees and estimate the differential indirect effects of town hall meetings as a function of the charac-
teristics of these active meeting participants.
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